


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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
SPECIAL REPORT

THE SOVIET MILITARY HIGH COMMAND

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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THE SOVIET MILITARY HIGH COMMAND

Soviet military policy is made primarily by a group of professional armed forces leaders of long-established political reliability who, for the most part, have held their leading positions since World War II. The present high command structure centers on a unified Ministry of Defense which is believed to include all major command and policy-making posts. A substantial majority of those holding these posts are over 60 years old and more than a quarter of them, including the defense minister and the chief of the General Staff, are over 65. (No member of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff is over 60.) The Soviet party now seems to be engaged in an effort to ensure its control over high command as it is taken over by the younger generation of officers during the next decade.

Little Recent Turnover

Khrushchev between 1956 and 1962 weeded out military officers who resisted his moves to extend the party's control over the armed forces or his extreme "modernization" of the military services. He prematurely retired many officers occupying posts in the second echelon of the defense establishment and transferred a few senior military leaders to positions tantamount to semiretirement. Many of these were replaced in 1960 when Khrushchev promoted some 450 generals in an apparent effort to "pack" the armed forces with men sympathetic to his personal military doctrine. Khrushchev's actions, however, had little effect on those occupying the most important positions in the Ministry of Defense.

Some of these men, in fact, apparently find it impossible to

retire even when age and health demand it. For example, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zakharov, 68-year-old chief of the General Staff, has stated privately that he hoped to retire. 25X1

The careers of most of the current members of the high command embrace some of the following: the October 1917 Revolution, the civil war, the industrialization and collectivization and the great purges of the 1930s, as well as World War II and the postwar tempering under Stalin and Khrushchev. Several already occupied important positions on the eve of the war, having proven themselves during the 1920s and the 1930s. 25X1

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THE SOVIET MILITARY HIGH COMMAND

(Ages Shown in Parentheses)

Ministry of Defense

Marshal of the Soviet Union
* R. YA. MALINOVSKIY (68)

Marshal Sov. Union
* A. A. GRECHKO (63)

Marshal Sov. Union
* M. V. ZAKHAROV (68)

General of the Army
* M. I. KAZAKOV (65)

General of the Army
* P. F. BATITSKIY (56)

Marshal Sov. Union
* N. I. KRYLOV (63)

Marshal of Aviation
* V. A. SUDETS (62)

Chief Marshal of Aviation
* K. A. VERSHININ (66)

Admiral of the Fleet
* S. G. GORSHKOV (56)

Marshal Sov. Union
* I. KH. BAGRAMYAN (69)

Marshal Sov. Union
* V. I. CHUYKOV (66)

General of the Army
* V. A. PENKOVSKIY (62)

Chief Marshal of Armored Troops
P. A. ROTMISTROV (65)

General of the Army
* A. A. YEPISHEV (58)

Marshal Sov. Union
* K. S. MOSKALENKO (64)

Marshals Sov. Union
* I. S. KONEV (69)
* K. K. ROKOSSOVSKIY (70)
* V. K. SOKOLOVSKIY (69)
* S. K. TIMOSHENKO (71)
* A. I. YEREMENKO (74)

Generals of the Army
P. I. BATOV (69)
I. V. TYULENEV (76)
A. S. ZHADOV (66)

Minister of Defense

Cmdr. in Chief,
Warsaw Pact Forces
Chief of General Staff

1st Dep. Chief of General Staff
Chief of Staff, Warsaw Pact Forces
1st Dep. Chief of General Staff

Cmdr. in Chief,
Strategic Missile Forces
Cmdr. in Chief,
Air Defense Forces
Cmdr. in Chief, Air Forces

Cmdr. in Chief, Navy

Chief of Rear Services

Chief of Civil Defense

Chief, Main Combat Training
Directorate
Chief, Main Directorate for Higher
Military Educational Institutions
Chief, Main Political Directorate

Chief, Inspector General Group

Members of Inspector General
Group

Members of Inspector General
Group

Groups of Forces

General of the Army
* P. K. KOSHEVOY (62)

Col. Generals
G. V. BAKLANOV (56)
K. I. PROVALOV (58)

Cmdr. in Chief, Group of
Soviet Forces in Germany

Cmdr., Northern Group of Forces
Cmdr., Southern Group of Forces

Military District Commanders

Generals of the Army
A. P. BELOBORODOV (63)
I. I. YAKUBOVSKIY (54)
I. A. PLIYEV (64)
* A. T. STUCHENKO (62)

Col. Gen. of Artillery
G. I. KHETAGUROV (63)

Col. Gen. of Armored Troops
* S. S. MARYAKHIN (57)

Col. Generals
* P. N. LASHCHENKO (56)
* I. G. PAVLOVSKIY (57)
* S. L. SOKOLOV (?)
A. KH. BABADZHANYAN (60)
S. P. IVANOV (59)
D. F. ALEKSEYEV (64)
* N. G. LYASHCHENKO (?)

Lt. Generals
A. A. YEGOROVSKIY (?)
* N. V. OGARKOV (?)

Moscow
Kiev
North Caucasus
Transcaucasus

Baltic

Belorussian

Carpathian
Far East
Leningrad
Odessa
Siberian
Transbaykal
Turkestan

Ural
Volga

Fleet Commanders

Admirals
A. YE. OREL (58)
S. YE. CHURSIN (61)
* S. M. LOBOV (53)
* N. N. AMELKO (52)

Baltic
Black Sea
Northern
Pacific

* Asterisks designate members of central party organs.

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During World War II these men held the positions of high responsibility, serving as commanders of armies or fronts or occupying important posts in the central military administration. They are the prestigious heroes of the only major war in which the Soviet Union has participated. During the course of their careers they have acquired the military and political acumen necessary for them to rise and to hold the top military posts.

Need for Political Reliability

The durability of the senior military leaders cannot be explained merely in terms of the "united front" of the military against the political leadership; the military establishment has never been that monolithic. The party apparently preferred to have the older military leaders occupy the most important posts in the Ministry of Defense while it was reasserting its political control over the armed forces after the demotion of Marshal Zhukov, the national hero, and during Khrushchev's controversial "modernization" of the military services.

Other, somewhat younger, military leaders who had acquired valuable wartime military experience and political connections and had survived the postwar purges were also available. However, these officers largely trace their careers to the war, which gave them an opportunity to prove their abilities as professional soldiers. This emphasis

on professionalism distinguishes them from the older leaders whose careers to a greater extent are the products of their political as well as their professional military experience.

Thus the retention of the politically minded military leaders in the highest positions in the armed services was probably designed to ensure the continued political reliability of the high command during the postwar period of transition for the officer corps. These thoroughly "politicized" members of the high command are apparently being retained while the political leadership remains somewhat unsettled in the aftermath of Khrushchev's ouster.

A professional, technically educated but somewhat apolitical officer corps is developing, and the party appears to be apprehensive that this development could in time reduce the party's control over the armed forces. Under these conditions, the present members of the high command may be expected to retain their positions as long as they are physically able to do so.

High Command Harmony

The advanced average age of the high command does not appear to have adversely affected the development of the Soviet armed forces. The long terms in office have on the contrary provided the armed forces with continuity in command and a steadfast adherence to a basic program of development. Theoreticians

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of the high command seem to agree on the fundamental primacy of the strategic nuclear rocket in modern general war.

However, their doctrinal statements have long since dropped the facade of unity of opinion which these officers appeared to display under Stalin. Public and nonpublic debates continue over many important doctrinal and strategic decisions centering on questions of the character of future wars, and the relationship and allocation of resources between conventional and strategic forces.

The Next Generation

There is little evidence as yet to forecast the men who will be administering Soviet military affairs in the years ahead. In one respect, the younger military leaders will be in a weaker position than their predecessors since they lack the political prestige of the older marshals. On the other hand, their leverage on policy may be strengthened by virtue of the military-technical revolution of the nuclear age which has tended to put a high premium on knowledge and experience. Their contributions to the policy-making process, based on their experience with modern weapons systems, may give them a status that will at least in part make up for the personal influence of the old marshals.

Party Control Over New Leaders

The party continues efforts to reinforce its dominance over the military to ensure control of the younger generation of generals and marshals who within the next five to ten years will assume control of the armed forces.

This trend was evident in the changes in the military representation in the Soviet central party organs (central committee and central auditing commission) announced at the 23rd Party Congress in April. General Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Administration of the armed forces, was joined in the party organs by the political chiefs of the Strategic Rocket Troops, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and the Moscow Military District. The number of largely inactive marshals holding central party posts was also increased. Meanwhile, the current membership in the central party organs continued to reflect the traditional balance between the Ministry of Defense in Moscow and key area commands; the ratio of military officers to civilians was maintained.

The combined increases of political and older officers appears to be in line with stepped-up efforts to improve military discipline and morale and to foster patriotism. This military

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representation on the party's central organs is apparently intended to ensure against radical departures from approved policy by the younger military technicians who in the interim may be advanced to key military posts upon the death or retirement of the present incumbents.

Despite the end of the Khrushchev era of military doctrine-by-decree, the party, speaking

through the central committee, intends to maintain the military reins. As recently as last May Defense Minister Malinovskiy reaffirmed the party's primary role in this respect, stating that "the Central Committee CPSU has worked out the basic tenets of military doctrine and has determined the general line for the development of the armed forces, military technology, and armament...."

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